Bitcoin Transaction Graph Analysis - MIT CSAIL

Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir

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Bitcoin Transaction Graph Analysis: Challenging bitcoin anonymity

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Structure and Anonymity of the Bitcoin Transaction Graph

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph (.pdf)

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir

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Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir

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[PDF] The Anonymity of the Bitcoin Transaction Graph

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Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees

arXiv:1805.11060
Date: 2018-05-28
Author(s): Giulia Fanti, Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Surya Bakshi, Bradley Denby, Shruti Bhargava, Andrew Miller, Pramod Viswanath

Link to Paper


Abstract
Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.

References
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[4] [n. d.]. The Kovri I2P Router Project. ([n. d.]). https://github.com/monero-project/kovri.
[5] [n. d.]. Monero. ([n. d.]). https://getmonero.org/home.
[6] 2015. Bitcoin Core Commit 5400ef6. (2015). https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/5400ef6bcb9d243b2b21697775aa6491115420f3.
[7] 2016. reddit/monero. (2016). https://www.reddit.com/Monero/comments/4aki0k/what_is_the_status_of_monero_and_i2p/.
[8] Elli Androulaki, Ghassan O Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer, and Srdjan Capkun. 2013. Evaluating user privacy in bitcoin. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 34–51.
[9] Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, and Laurent Vanbever. 2016. Hijacking Bitcoin: Large-scale Network Attacks on Cryptocurrencies. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07524 (2016).
[10] Krishna B Athreya and Peter E Ney. 2004. Branching processes. Courier Corporation.
[11] Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivan Pustogarov. 2014. Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 15–29.
[12] Alex Biryukov and Ivan Pustogarov. 2015. Bitcoin over Tor isn’t a good idea. In Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 122–134.
[13] John Bohannon. 2016. Why criminals can’t hide behind Bitcoin. Science (2016).
[14] Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Giulia Fanti, and Pramod Viswanath. 2017. Dandelion: Redesigning the Bitcoin Network for Anonymity. POMACS 1, 1 (2017), 22.
[15] D. Chaum. 1988. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of cryptology 1, 1 (1988).
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[18] George Danezis, Claudia Diaz, Emilia Käsper, and Carmela Troncoso. 2009. The wisdom of Crowds: attacks and optimal constructions. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. Springer, 406–423.
[19] George Danezis, Claudia Diaz, Carmela Troncoso, and Ben Laurie. 2010. Drac: An Architecture for Anonymous Low-Volume Communications.. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Vol. 6205. Springer, 202–219.
[20] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. 2004. Tor: The second-generation onion router. Technical Report. DTIC Document.
[21] G. Fanti, P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath. 2015. Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation. In SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev., Vol. 43. 271–284. Issue 1.
[22] Giulia Fanti and Pramod Viswanath. 2017. Anonymity Properties of the Bitcoin P2P Network. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.08761 (2017).
[23] M.J. Freedman and R. Morris. 2002. Tarzan: A peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In Proc. CCS. ACM.
[24] Sam Frizell. 2015. Bitcoins Are Easier To Track Than You Think. Time (January 2015).
[25] Adam Efe Gencer and Emin Gün Sirer. 2017. State of the Bitcoin Network. Hacking Distributed, http://hackingdistributed.com/2017/02/15/state-of-the-bitcoin-network/. (February 2017).
[26] S. Goel, M. Robson, M. Polte, and E. Sirer. 2003. Herbivore: A scalable and efficient protocol for anonymous communication. Technical Report.
[27] P. Golle and A. Juels. 2004. Dining cryptographers revisited. In Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 2004.
[28] Ethan Heilman, Leen Alshenibr, Foteini Baldimtsi, Alessandra Scafuro, and Sharon Goldberg. 2016. TumbleBit: An untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub. Technical Report. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/575.
[29] TE Jedusor. 2016. Mimblewimble. (2016).
[30] Philip Koshy. 2013. CoinSeer: A Telescope Into Bitcoin. Ph.D. Dissertation. The Pennsylvania State University.
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[35] Marc Mezard and Andrea Montanari. 2009. Information, physics, and computation. Oxford University Press.
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[39] Micha Ober, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Kay Hamacher. 2013. Structure and anonymity of the bitcoin transaction graph. Future internet 5, 2 (2013), 237–250.
[40] Larry L Peterson and Bruce S Davie. 2007. Computer networks: a systems approach. Elsevier.
[41] P. C. Pinto, P. Thiran, and M. Vetterli. 2012. Locating the source of diffusion in large-scale networks. Physical review letters 109, 6 (2012), 068702.
[42] Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigan. 2013. An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system. In Security and privacy in social networks. Springer, 197–223.
[43] Michael K Reiter and Aviel D Rubin. 1998. Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 1, 1 (1998), 66–92.
[44] Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir. 2013. Quantitative analysis of the full bitcoin transaction graph. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 6–24.
[45] Tim Ruffing, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, and Aniket Kate. 2014. CoinShuffle: Practical decentralized coin mixing for Bitcoin. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. Springer, 345–364.
[46] Eli Ben Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer, and Madars Virza. 2014. Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin. In Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 459–474.
[47] Alexander Schrijver. 2002. Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency. Vol. 24. Springer Science & Business Media.
[48] Rob Sherwood, Bobby Bhattacharjee, and Aravind Srinivasan. 2005. P5: A protocol for scalable anonymous communication. Journal of Computer Security 13, 6 (2005), 839–876.
[49] Jelle van den Hooff, David Lazar, Matei Zaharia, and Nickolai Zeldovich. [n. d.]. Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis. ([n. d.]).
[50] Zhaoxu Wang, Wenxiang Dong, Wenyi Zhang, and Chee Wei Tan. 2014. Rumor source detection with multiple observations: Fundamental limits and algorithms. In ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Vol. 42. ACM, 1–13.
[51] David Isaac Wolinsky, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Bryan Ford, and Aaron Johnson. 2012. Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale.. In OSDI. 179–182.
[52] M. Zamani, J. Saia, M. Movahedi, and J. Khoury. 2013. Towards provably-secure scalable anonymous broadcast. In USENIX FOCI.
[53] Bassam Zantout and Ramzi Haraty. 2011. I2P data communication system. In Proceedings of ICN. Citeseer, 401–409.
[54] Kai Zhu and Lei Ying. 2014. A robust information source estimator with sparse observations. Computational Social Networks 1, 1 (2014), 3.
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An Analysis of Attacks on Blockchain Consensus

arXiv:1610.07985
Date: 2016-11-20
Author(s): George Bissias, Brian Neil Levine, A. Pinar Ozisik, Gavin Andresen

Link to Paper


Abstract
We present and validate a novel mathematical model of the blockchain mining process and use it to conduct an economic evaluation of the double-spend attack, which is fundamental to all blockchain systems. Our analysis focuses on the value of transactions that can be secured under a conventional double-spend attack, both with and without a concurrent eclipse attack. Our model quantifies the importance of several factors that determine the attack's success, including confirmation depth, attacker mining power, and any confirmation deadline set by the merchant. In general, the security of a transaction against a double-spend attack increases roughly logarithmically with the depth of the block, made easier by the increasing sum of coin turned-over (between individuals) in the blocks, but more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. In recent blockchain data, we observed a median block turnover value of 6 BTC. Based on this value, a merchant requiring a single confirmation is protected against only attackers that can increase the current mining power by 1% or less. However, similar analysis shows that a merchant that requires a much longer 72 confirmations (~12 hours) will eliminate all potential profit for any double-spend attacker adding mining power less than 40% of the current mining power.

References
  1. Back, A., Corallo, M., Dashjr, L., Mark, F., Maxwell, G., Miller, A., Poelstra, A., Timón, J., Wuille, P.: Enabling Blockchain Innovations with Pegged Sidechains. http://www.opensciencereview.com/papers/123/enablingblockchain-innovations-with-pegged-sidechains (October 2014)
  2. Bissias, G., Ozisik, A.P., Levine, B.N., Liberatore, M.: Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin. In: Proc. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (November 2014), http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.wpes.2014.pdf
  3. Confirmation. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Confirmation (February 2015)
  4. Bonneau, J., Miller, A., Clark, J., Narayanan, A., Kroll, J., Felten, E.: Sok: Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. In: IEEE S&P. pp. 104–121 (May 2015), http://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.14
  5. Bonneau, J.: How long does it take for a bitcoin transaction to be confirmed? https://coincenter.org/2015/11/what-does-it-mean-for-a-bitcoin-transactionto-be-confirmed/ (November 2015)
  6. Croman, K., et al.: On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains . In: Workshop on Bitcoin and Blockchain Research (Feb 2016)
  7. Douceur, J.: The Sybil Attack. In: Proc. Intl Wkshp on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS) (Mar 2002)
  8. Ethereum Homestead Documentation. http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/
  9. Eyal, I., Sirer, E.G.: Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable. Financial Cryptography pp. 436–454 (2014), http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_28
  10. Fischer, M., Lynch, N., Paterson, M.: Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process. JACM 32(2), 374–382 (1985)
  11. Gervais, A., O. Karame, G., Wust, K., Glykantzis, V., Ritzdorf, H., Capkun, S.: On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/555 (2016)
  12. Heilman, E., Alshenibr, L., Baldimtsi, F., Scafuro, A., Goldberg, S.: Tumblebit: An untrusted bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/575 (2016), http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/575
  13. Heilman, E., Kendler, A., Zohar, A., Goldberg, S.: Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-peer Network. In: USENIX Security (2015)
  14. Litecoin. http://litecoin.org/
  15. Meiklejohn, S., Pomarole, M., Jordan, G., Levchenko, K., McCoy, D., Voelker, G., Savage, S.: A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names. In: Proc. ACM IMC. pp. 127–140 (2013), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2504730.2504747
  16. Nakamoto, S.: Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (May 2009)
  17. Pagnia, H., Vogt, H., Gaertner, F.: Fair Exchange. The Computer Journal, vol. 46, num. 1, p. 55, 2003. 46(1), 55–78 (2003)
  18. Poon, J., Dryja, T.: The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments. http://www.lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf (November 2015)
  19. Ron, D., Shamir, A.: Quantitative analysis of the full bitcoin transaction graph. In: Proc. Financial Crypto. pp. 6–24 (Apr 2013), http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_2
  20. Rosenfeld, M.: Analysis of hashrate-based double-spending. https://bitcoil.co.il/Doublespend.pdf (December 2012)
  21. Sapirshtein, A., Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A.: Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.06183.pdf (July 2015)
  22. Sasson, E.B., Chiesa, A., Garman, C., Green, M., Miers, I., Tromer, E., Virza, M.: Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin. In: IEEE S&P. pp. 459–474 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2014.36
  23. Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A.: Secure high-rate transaction processing in Bitcoin. Financial Cryptography and Data Security (2015), http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_32
  24. Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A.: Bitcoin’s Security Model Revisited. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09193 (May 2016)
  25. Tschorsch, F., Scheuermann, B.: Bitcoin and beyond: A technical survey on decentralized digital currencies. IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials PP(99), 1–1 (2016)
submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Why large chunks of early mined coins never been used?

Here is an interesting read, Analysis of the Bitcoin Transaction Graph
http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf
It was ran in May 2012, so it is a bit old (and I would love to see a newer analysis), but what I am going to address this will still do. According to the analysis, by May 2012 there were about 9 million BTCs created, but only about 2 millions were in circulation, being transfered for whatever reasons. The authors also mention that most of the earliest created coins never moved. Now let's speculate what could be the reasons for this, and if we find the correct answer, we might find the answer why Bitcoins were created in the first place. By earliest coins I mean the first 3-4 million mined.
Reasons for coins never moved after creation:
  1. They were lost before they could be used. This is a fairly simple, neutral and probably true reason. We could argue just what % is lost, specially in the early days when the coins were useless (thus people who got them simply forgot about them and the coins never recovered), but this number could be significant. I read somewhere that the size of the newer coins lost is in the hundred thousands. So we could assume that as much as half million early coins could have been lost.
  2. The early adopters trusted so much that Bitcoin's value is going to take off, that simply they are still holding them, instead of circulating them. This could also be possible, but I have a few problems with this explanation. First, it is incredibly hard to time any market. So if early adopters are still holding, they have to be very astute investors and they were able to hold through a pretty decent runup to $30 and the following crash last year, without the temptation and fear of cashing out. We also have to assume that in the time between now and the creation (2-3 years) they didn't need most of the money. Most investors would start to cash out at least partially, once the value takes off. But anyway,if the whole point of making Bitcoin was to create a new and decentralized currency, why are these people hording? Why didn't they spread the then worthless coins (keeping maybe a little for themselves, just in case) so more would be in circulation and it could be used as currency??? The whole altruistic, I create a virtual money for all to use and never to inflate thingy just sound fake, once you know the fact of early coins never been used... Again, it is hard to put a % on it, but I am sure at least a few of the earliest miners have been holding until this day. When you are planning to sell for 1000s, little price changes like 50 to 150 is just noise.
  3. What if Satoshi and his team were really US government employees and Bitcoin is a test, an experience by the NSA (or your favorite government agency)? Then the earliest millions of coins were mined on government computers and thus they would be considered government property. When Bitcoin was worthless, who cared? But when it started to take off in value, they couldn't just sell government property for personal gain, right? I guess they could donate it and give it away, but not cashing it out... IAlso they might keep them for future action, if let's say they eventually want to crash the market and the idea.
  4. Some combination of the above reasons...
    I would like to hear more possible reasons, but I think these 3 could be the main ones. I personally don't buy the altruistic/hobby creator explanation and tend to think that Bitcoin was either made for personal gains or as a government experience....
submitted by VirtualMoneyLover to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Why do I believe it was BCN destiny to be born in 2012?

Why do I believe it was BCN destiny to be born in 2012? Just look at this and see yourself:
1983 - Blind signatures were invented by David Chaum link 1997 - HashCash (proof of work system) was invented by Adam Back link
2001 - Ring signatures were invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Yael Tauman link
2003 - Mart n Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Ted Wobber presented "Moderately hard, memory-bound functions"link
2004 - Patrick P. Tsang and Victor K. Wei presented their paper "Short linkable ring signatures for e-voting, e-cash and attestation" link
2005 - Matthew Franklin and Haibin Zhang with "Unique Group Signatures" study link
2005 - Exponential memory-bound functions for proof of work protocols by Fabien Coelho link +2006 - "Traceable Ring Signature" by Fujisaki and Suzuki link
2008 - Bitcoin whitepaper by Satoshi Nakamoto link
2009 - Stronger key derivation via sequential memory-hard functions by Colin Percival link
2009 - First Bitcoin block was generated
2010 -2012 - Bitcoin Anonymity Problem Discussions link
2011 - An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System, Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigwere link
5/15/2012 - Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir made Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph link
6/8/2012 - Bytecoin Wiki started link
6/30/2012 - Bytecoin launch announcement link- first news
7/4/2012 - First BCN block was generated link
8/6/2012 - Destination Address Anonymization in Bitcoin (one-time addresses in BCN) link
10/19/2012 - Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin by Elli Androulaki, Ghassan O. Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer, Srdjan Capkun. link
12/12/2012 -CryptoNote whitepaper v 1.0 link
12/13/2012 - Analysis of hashrate-based double-spending, Meni Rosenfeld link
10/17/2013 - CryptoNote whitepaper v 2.0 link
Here we see how the technology logically came to the advent of cryptocurrencies with ring signature and memory-bound function PoW implementation. Soon after Bitcoin's release the community started to raise concerns about its anonymity with multiple solutions and propositions. High concentration of theoretical papers on these topics in 2009-2011 most probably spurred the brightest minds to make attempts of practical e-cash with ring signatures realization. Therefore, BCN couldn't but appear in 2012.
Based on https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=512747.msg7093354#msg7093354
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Bitcoin: Market Cap v Money Supply

We should probably not think of the Bitcoin money supply (Price x bitcoin in circulation) as market cap. Better to compare like with like. We can compare with other currencies. We can do this in terms of the M1 money supply (which equates to cash, checking accounts and other "near money" vehicles).
One lightly used currency, the Icelandic Kroner, has M1 of about $3.3 bn at the moment. The population of Iceland is 327,000.
Right now (June 12th) we could say that Bitcoin has an M1 of roughly $10 bn - three times as much, implying (very roughly) a Bitcoin population of about 1 million citizens.
Bitcoin M1 is also a little less than one three hundredth of the MI money supply of the US with its 300+ millions of citizens - which also indicates a Bitcoin population of about 1 million citizens.
Bitcoin is (clearly) also a vehicle for speculation, so this is only a rough equation and does not properly indicate how much Bitcoin usage reflects payments. However the Bitcoin transaction graph has a clear upward trend indicating a growing population of bitcoin users.
This should lead us to expect that if the Bitcoin user population increase by a factor of 10 then so will the price - although it may do more than that because the speculators would probably go wild and create a temporary bubble in the currency's value.
The Bitcoin population will definitely increase by such a factor because it is a viral currency. It is impossible (for me at least) to know how fast that population will grow and what its practical upper limit is.
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Let's contact Ron and Shamir asking them to help us fully map MtGox presence on the blockchain.

Some time ago there was a really good paper studying the blockchain. In this they studied the whole blockchain and connected the accounts that sent money together as coming from the same wallet.
Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph from Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir
By doing this they could identify several whales.
Now, I think that with the situation with MtGox we should ask the help from those two researchers, and fully map MtGox activity. If we all share the entry point and the exit address in which we sent money and received money from MtGox it should be quite easy to just map the whole animal out. This would be divided, I suppose, in entry address, exit address, inside address never used but only rarely to store coins, in between address. And then maybe we can start to see exactly from which address some bitcoins have been siphoned out.
It's just a simple unidirectional graph. I don't know how many nodes will it have, but probably we should be able to even draw it.
Any comments before contacting them?
submitted by pietrosperoni to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Analyzing the Bitcoin Graph/Reading bootstrap.dat

I'd like to do some analytics on the Bitcoin transactions graph. I've downloaded bootstrap.dat, but I don't know how to read it, what format it's in, etc. Can anyone help me out here?
submitted by fynthase to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

P2Pcash means no middlemen that you need to have faith in. I only need to trust the network. Because I know at least 1 miner will eventually mine my transaction and spread to the whole network. Because of a near complete graph in bitcoin network.

submitted by haf_demon to btc [link] [comments]

Graph - Visualizing Metcalfe's Law: The relationship between Bitcoin's market cap and the square of the number of transactions

Graph - Visualizing Metcalfe's Law: The relationship between Bitcoin's market cap and the square of the number of transactions submitted by ydtm to btc [link] [comments]

Graph: Mempool Transaction Count - The number of transactions waiting to be confirmed. Backlogs at an all-time high, users experiencing delays, unable to transact, miners losing fees. Bitcoin network congested and unreliable due to Core/Blockstream's never-ending obstructionism, censorship and lies.

Graph:
https://blockchain.info/charts/mempool-count?timespan=all
Core/Blockstream is sabotaging the network by forcing everyone to use their shitty tiny 1 MB "max blocksize" when everyone knows the network can already support 4 MB blocks.
It's time for the Bitcoin community to tell the owners of Blockstream and "the devs they rode in on" to go fuck themselves.
Bitcoin Unlimited is the real Bitcoin, in line with Satoshi's vision.
Meanwhile, BlockstreamCoin+RBF+SegWitAsASoftFork+LightningCentralizedHub-OfflineIOUCoin is some kind of weird unrecognizable double-spendable non-consensus-driven fiat-financed offline centralized settlement-only non-P2P "altcoin".
Smart miners like ViaBTC have already upgraded to Bitcoin Unlimited - and more and more users and miners are dumping Core.
The best way to ensure Bitcoin's continued success is to abandon the corrupt incompetent liars from Core/Blockstream - and move forward with simple, safe on-chain scaling now by upgrading to Bitcoin Unlimited.
submitted by ydtm to btc [link] [comments]

These graphs show that fees for inclusion in 2nd block just shot up 10x from 50 to 500 satoshis/kB, and mempool size just shot up from <5 MB to 30 MB. Would you feel safe sending a transaction into the network now? Can Bitcoin rally if the blocksize remains artificially limited by Blockstream/Core?

http://statoshi.info/dashboard/db/fee-estimates
To select a longer time period, zoom out on the graph by clicking on the word "6 hours ago" to the right of the words "Zoom Out" - which will reveal a drop-down menu.
https://tradeblock.com/bitcoin
To see the increase in the Mempool Size (from less than 5 MB, to 30 MB), go to the graph on the graph on the lower right called "Recent Mempool", and use the two menus to select "7 Days" and "Size".
How can Bitcoin continue to rally, if the network is becoming backlogged due to unnecessary congestion?
submitted by ydtm to btc [link] [comments]

Graph representation of 15 minutes bitcoin transactions.

Graph representation of 15 minutes bitcoin transactions. submitted by maesoser to generative [link] [comments]

BitCoin Transaction Visualization Bitcoin Transactions Explained Bitcoin transactions visualized using Gephi GraphXR Forensics  Bitcoin Visualization Tracking Bitcoin Transactions

While Bitcoin's presumed anonymity offers new avenues for commerce, several recent studies raise user-privacy concerns. We explore the level of anonymity in the Bitcoin system. Our approach is two-fold: (i) We annotate the public transaction graph by linking bitcoin public keys to "real" people - either definitively or statistically. How long does an average bitcoin transaction take? A transfer is completed in about 10 minutes in 2020. Mempool & Block size determine bitcoin transaction time. Check Bitcoin (BTC) transaction, value: 0.00052521, date: 2020-07-19 The total number of mined bitcoin that are currently circulating on the network. Market Price. The average USD market price across major bitcoin exchanges. Market Capitalization (USD) The median time for a transaction with miner fees to be included in a mined block and added to the public ledger. Bitcoin Transaction Graph Analysis Michael Fleder [email protected] Michael S. Kester [email protected] Sudeep Pillai [email protected] January 3, 2014 1 Introduction Bitcoins have recently become an increasingly popular cryptocurrency through which users trade electroni-cally and more anonymously than via traditional electronic transfers.

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BitCoin Transaction Visualization

Analyzing Blockchain and Bitcoin Transaction Data as a Graph - Duration: 45:57. Oracle Developers 739 views. 45:57 🔥 HOW to GRILL a STEAK by Master Chef Robert Del Grande - Duration: 9:01. Analyzing Blockchain and Bitcoin Transaction Data as a Graph - Duration: 45:57. Oracle Developers 919 views. 45:57 #13 Maltego real world example - Duration: 7:05. Pine Leaves 3,249 views. The Bitcoin Mempool, Difficulty Adjustment, Hashrate, Block Time, Block Reward, Transaction Fees and much more is explained simply in this video. Bitcoin onchain data: https://studio.glassnode.com ... The visualization tool is given a starting transaction and graphs all the tx outputs from tx to tx. A max number of tx steps limit the graph depth. 5 steps was used for this video. The large nodes ... The number of bitcoin in circulation, the number of transactions per day, Google search interest, the value of one bitcoin, and the hash rate of the bitcoin network. Transactions: https ...

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